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BOOK REVIEWS

Evidentialism and the Will to Believe, by Scott F. Aikin. Bloomsbury, 2014. Pp.
214. $120.00 (hardcover).
MICHAEL PACE, Chapman University
In his introduction, Scott Aikin remarks that there has never before been
a book-length commentary on W. K. Clifford’s “The Ethics of Belief” and
William James’s “The Will to Believe.” “With this book,” he announces,
“that changes.” One might worry—as I did at first—that there may be
compelling reasons why there has not been a book such as Aikin gives us,
which consists in a section-by-section summary and critical analysis of
each essay, in two very long chapters. (A concluding, third chapter functions more as an appendix, taking up some loose ends.) After all, both
James’s and Clifford’s essays were originally written for non-specialists,
and they are clear enough to be anthologized in introductory textbooks
that many of us require our beginning students to read. Wouldn’t a booklength commentary be tedious or otiose?
I am pleased to report that any such worries about Aikin’s project are
misplaced. The book is engaging as well as careful, and it touches insightfully on a surprisingly wide range of fundamental issues in epistemology and ethics. It is also a highly enjoyable read, chock-full of humor. I
could imagine basing a successful upper-level undergraduate course on
just Aikin’s book and the two primary sources. A “slow reading” course
of this sort would model for students how a philosopher carefully reads
and criticizes important texts, and it would have a suitable breadth. Moreover, there are payoffs here for experts, since Aikin ably argues for some
distinctive interpretative and philosophical claims, some of which I will
critically examine in the remainder of this review.
Aikin adjudicates the Clifford-James dispute in favor of Clifford.
He argues that Clifford’s case for evidentialism is cogent (with some
“tweaking”), whereas James’s project fails even on the most generous interpretation. Aikin summarizes Clifford’s evidentialism in the following
“Integrated Evidentialist Rule” (IER):
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(IER) If any subject (S) believes any proposition (p) at any time (t), then S has
properly done so only if: (i) S has sufficient evidence at t that p is true, and
(ii) all doubts S has had (and should have) regarding p’s truth or falsity have
been investigated so that there are no truths S could have easily discovered
that would have affected S’s evidence. (49–50)

The first condition of IER is intended to capture Clifford’s famous dictum:
“It is wrong always, everywhere and for anyone to believe anything on
insufficient evidence.” The second is intended to capture Clifford’s lesserknown principle that it is wrong to believe things that one has not investigated with due diligence. On Aikin’s interpretation, it is moral wrongness
that Clifford has in view; IER should thus be understood as an ethical
principle giving conditions for morally proper belief, rather than an epistemic principle intended to illuminate some familiar kind of epistemic
property (such as justification, knowledge, or rationality).
Aikin defends IER against several prominent objections, including the
charge that Clifford’s principle is too demanding, leading to a problematic skepticism. In response to the skeptical challenge, Aikin teases out
of Clifford’s essay a remarkably comprehensive epistemology, including
proposals—which deserve more considerations than I can give here—for
responding to Pyrrhonian skepticism and Hume’s challenge to induction,
as well as substantive accounts of moral and testimonial knowledge.
However, a weakness of Aikin’s anti-skeptical defense is that he offers
very little guidance about what it means for evidence to be sufficient. Notice
that “sufficient” in IER cannot be short for “sufficient for counting as morally
proper,” since that would render the first condition trivial. One approach to
explicating evidential sufficiency might appeal to a threshold of epistemic
probability (the likelihood of a proposition on one’s total evidence). One will
then owe an account of how high the threshold is. Is it enough that evidence
makes a proposition more likely than not, or must it make a proposition
100 percent certain, or somewhere in between? A second approach might
treat “sufficient” as short for “sufficient for knowledge-grade justification.”
The strictness of the principle will then depend on the correct account of
evidential standards for justification and knowledge, which is a matter of
debate in epistemology. Descartes and contemporary infallibilists about
knowledge have extremely high standards, requiring epistemic certainty.
Fallibilists require something less than certainty, but owe an account of how
low the standards can be.
The threat that IER might lead to skepticism, of course, will be much
more serious if evidential sufficiency demands meeting very high, or even
infallibilist standards. Aikin does not discuss the fallibilism/infallibilism
debate, but he does point out that Clifford implicitly rejects Cartesian
standards of evidence by allowing some cases of testimony and inductive reasoning to count as sufficient evidence. This makes it all the more
important, though, to clarify how strict the evidential standards for inductive evidence are. (The threat of skepticism is also more serious than
Aikin seems to realize for the specific account of appropriate testimonial
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belief that he attributes to Clifford, which requires that hearers meet the
following “testimonial requirement of knowledge”: “Listener A may hold
that attester B has satisfied the testimonial requirement of knowledge for
testimony that p only if A has reason to believe that (i) B’s claim that p is
the kind of content that has publicly verifiable evidence so that A could
access this evidence and (ii) B’s claim that p is the result of B’s sufficient
inquiry regarding p and access to sufficient evidence that p” [63].)
Clifford’s central examples (the shipbuilder who negligently sends an
unseaworthy ship out to sea and the islanders who convict a group of
natives on trumped up charges) suggest that he had in mind very high,
though not infallibilist, evidential standards. The shipbuilder’s belief that
the ship is seaworthy would still be seriously morally wrong even if he
had a slight preponderance of evidence that made the proposition just
barely more likely than a coin toss. Something closer to certain evidence
seems required for his belief to be appropriate.
Of course, Clifford’s shipbuilder and islanders cases are idiosyncratic
insofar as the moral risk of error is extraordinarily high; if a false belief
is formed and acted upon, people die. A question that Aikin does not explicitly take up is whether standards for sufficient evidence are invariant
or whether they might vary in different circumstances. IER, as stated, is
consistent with the idea that the standards for sufficient evidence might
vary depending on the circumstances. Perhaps evidential standards for
belief are like evidential standards for court judgments, where we apply
a strict, beyond-reasonable-doubt standard in criminal cases but a lower,
preponderance-of evidence standard in civil cases. In the contemporary
epistemology literature, “pragmatic encroachment” theorists have argued
that standards of evidence for justification or knowledge vary depending on practical or moral circumstances, and it is disappointing that Aikin
does not directly consider these issues, especially since some pragmatic
encroachment theorists claim inspiration from Clifford and James. (For
a defense of pragmatic encroachment that takes James as its inspiration,
see Michael Pace, “The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James’ ‘Will To Believe,’” Noûs 45 [2011]:
239–268; for a recent one inspired by Clifford, see Matthew McGrath and
Jeremy Fantl, “Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know,” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, ed. John Turri and Ernest Sosa, 2nd ed.
[Wiley-Blackwell, 2014], 84–94.)
Although he does not directly address the question of whether evidential standards might vary, some things Aikin says in the context of
defending Clifford suggest the view that the standards of evidence in
IER are invariably quite high (though not infallible). In his essay, Clifford
anticipates the objection that his high-stakes examples do not support
the generalization that it is always (everywhere, for anyone, etc.) wrong
to believe on insufficient evidence. Perhaps, according to the objector, it
is okay to form relatively trivial beliefs on insufficient evidence. Clifford
gives two replies intended to demonstrate that “no real belief, however
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trifling or fragmentary it may seem, is ever truly insignificant.” First, he
claims that the content of any belief may, for all we know, turn out to have
more important consequences than it seems. (Aikin calls this the “Content
Slide.”) Second, Clifford claims that bad intellectual habits are formed by
believing even trivia on insufficient evidence.
Aikin argues that there is more to these responses than is often acknowledged. For example, he illustrates the plausibility of the Content
Slide with the following description of Karla, who has a seemingly trivial
belief that her favorite sports team (the Cowpokes) will win, even though
the evidence suggests otherwise.
How does the content slide happen? Well, perhaps with the fact that teams
that are of championship caliber should get media coverage. But the Cowpokes don’t get any. Well, there must be some reason for that, thinks Karla,
and she then hypothesizes that the media is ignoring the Cowpokes. There’s
likely a conspiracy against this team—they clearly are contenders, but get
not even a sniff. The fix must be in. Nobody wants the Cowpokes to win, so
the media will ignore them with hopes they’ll go away. Every expert who
holds the Cowpokes have no chance, then, is part of conspiracy, and just
empty talking heads. And so Karla has gone from one overbelief born of enthusiasm to now a belief that she can’t trust most of the experts on a matter
of circumstance to her. If the sports case isn’t moving, consider this analogous to politics and one’s favored candidate. (35)

As I write this, at the start of a Trump presidency, one can hardly fail to appreciate how the throw-away last line might inspire many more examples
of the content slide. Insufficiently supported political beliefs can (and do)
lead to conspiracy theories, distrust of longstanding institutions, and other
bad consequences. Further, Aikin supplements Clifford’s argument with a
good discussion of relevant work in social psychology on error amplification and polarization in groups. “Given our evidence of human and group
psychology,” he concludes, “overbelief is a dangerous business. Even if
it turns out that some are inert with regard to bad consequences, the fact
that so many have the bad consequences makes it objectionable to allow
any” (41). When it comes to belief, Aikin seems to suggest, the stakes are
always high because of the dangers inherent in believing falsehoods.
Even so, it seems exaggerated to think that we can never accurately
anticipate the likely consequences of our beliefs. The shipbuilder, for example, can surely know that the proposition that the ship is seaworthy
carries with it a lot more moral risk of error than beliefs he might form
by picking up a phonebook and reading from a page at random. Furthermore, as I will discuss below, James makes a compelling case that the risk
of error must be balanced with another risk that in some circumstances
can be much greater, namely the risk of failing to believe something that
turns out to be true.
Let us turn, then, to Aikin’s discussion of James, who famously held
that in special circumstances it is appropriate to believe propositions, including religious ones, for practical reasons. Aikin, poking fun at James’s
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over-the-top style, quips that James not only explicitly announces his
thesis but also “was good enough to put it all in italics” (111).
The Thesis I defend is, briefly stated, this: Our passional nature not only lawfully
may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under
such circumstances, ‘Do not decide, but leave the question open,’ is itself a passional
decision—just like deciding yes or no—and is attended with the same risk of losing
the truth (James, “The Will to Believe,” IV, emphasis in original).

As everyone familiar with James’s essay knows, “genuine option” is a
technical term that he cashes out in terms of three further semi-technical
terms. A genuine option is “living, momentous, and forced.” Following
many commentators, Aikin has some critical things to say about the way
James explains these conditions. He also presses a pithy initial worry,
which he calls the “less talkin’, more rockin’” objection. The idea is that
we have prima facie reason to be suspicious of the cogency of any argument that involves a lot of technicalities and qualifications in its setup, as
James’s argument does.
In a more serious mode, Aikin accuses James of moving the goalposts
(committing “the old switcheroo”). James begins his essay by promising
to defend something akin to traditional Christian belief, but by the end
of the essay he only defends the religiously obscure proposition “that the
best things are the more eternal things” and “that we are better off even
now if we believe . . . [this] first affirmation to be true” (“Will to Believe,”
X). As Aikin aptly points out, it is not clear what this proposition even
means, and it would certainly not be recognized as a central doctrine of
any major world religion.
According to Aikin, James commits the old switcheroo in an attempt
to paper over a crucial flaw in his central argument. On Aikin’s interpretation, the lynchpin of James’s argument is a set of counterexamples to
Clifford’s principle that involve “doxastically efficacious” beliefs. These
are cases in which, as James says, “faith in a fact can help create the fact”
(Section IX). James’s examples include an Alpine climber whose belief that
he can successfully jump across a crevasse is causally necessary for him
to be able to do so and a partygoer who believes that a stranger will like
him, thereby making it more likely that the stranger will. Propositions
that are doxastically efficacious are such that believing them either makes
them true or objectively likely to be true, and James argues that it is thus
appropriate to believe them for practical reasons, even without sufficient
evidence.
It is at this point in the argument that James makes the old switcheroo,
according to Aikin. Recognizing that his challenge to IER depends on the
special features of doxastically efficacious propositions, James cooks up a
proposition about the value of eternal things, which, he claims, captures
the essence of religious belief. James picks this unorthodox proposition, according to Aikin, because he thinks that it is doxastically efficacious. (Given
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some antirealist presuppositions about value, which Aikin attributes to
James based on other sources, believing that eternal things are supremely
valuable will make them supremely valuable.) But Aikin accuses James of
obscuring the fact that his argument only works for doxastically efficacious
beliefs, a fact that would require another qualification to his main thesis:
Someone may engage the will to believe only when a proposition is doxastically efficacious as well as living, momentous, forced, and undecidable on intellectual grounds. (Even more talkin’!) The revised thesis spells disaster for
James’s project as a defense of ordinary religious belief, since most orthodox
religious claims are not doxastically efficacious. A Christian’s believing that
God exists or that Jesus rose from the dead, for example, has no causal effect
on whether these propositions are true or objectively likely. Thus, James’s
argument involves a bait and switch that fails as a defense of the religious
beliefs of ordinary folk.
Further, Aikin objects that doxastically efficacious propositions are not
even genuine counterexamples to Clifford’s evidentialism. When we recognize that we believe a proposition that is doxastically efficacious, Aikin
says, “we have reason to hold that the fact will come to be. That’s evidence” (153). Aikin’s idea seems to be that the Alpine climber, for example,
will have the following argument available as evidence (where p is the
proposition, “I will successfully jump the crevasse”):
1. If I believe p, then p is likely to be true.
2. I do believe p.
3. So, p is likely to be true.
A defender of James has available several compelling replies to Aikin’s
interpretation and critique. First, Aikin’s attempt to defang James’s counterexamples is not convincing. To see why, we need first to note a subtle
difference between Aikin’s IER and Clifford’s original principle. Clifford
held that it is wrong to “believe on insufficient evidence.” But IER is
weaker, implying only that it is wrong to believe when one lacks sufficient evidence. IER omits a “basing requirement,” that is, a requirement
that proper beliefs must be based on the good evidence one has. When
this plausible requirement is added to IER, the counterexamples stand.
For, even if the Alpine climber has access to the above argument after she
believes, she could not properly base her belief on the argument, since it
includes as a premise that she already has the belief!
More important, there are more charitable interpretations of James, according to which the doxastically efficacious proposition counterexamples
are not central to James’s main argument. As I see it, the central and most
enduring part of James’s essay is his discussion of the two-part truth goal.
James points out that our intellectual goal is not just to avoid having false
beliefs but also to believe significant truths. Thus, James:
There are two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion—ways
entirely different, and yet about whose difference the theory of knowledge
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seems hitherto to have shown very little concern. . . . Believe truth! Shun
error!—these, we see, are two materially different laws; and by choosing
between them we may end by coloring differently our whole intellectual
life. We may regard the chase for truth as paramount, and the avoidance of
error as secondary; or we may, on the other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more imperative, and let truth take its chance. Clifford . . . exhorts us
to the latter course. Believe nothing, he tells us, keep your mind in suspense
forever, rather than by closing it on insufficient evidence incur the awful risk
of believing lies .(“Will to Believe, VII)

James’s insights are related to the statistical distinction between “type
1” and “type 2” errors. One commits a type 1 error when one has a belief
that turns out to be false, and a type 2 error when one fails to have a
belief in a proposition that is true. As James suggests, the two parts of
our intellectual goal are in tension. Moreover, as several contemporary
epistemologists have pointed out, different evidential standards involve
different proposals for how to strike an appropriate balance. Adopting
infallible evidential standards would assure one of avoiding type 1 errors,
but skepticism would be the result and type 2 errors would abound.
Adopting lower standards will lower the risk of type 2 errors, but at a
greater risk of type 1 errors. (For discussion, see Wayne Riggs, “Balancing
Our Epistemic Ends,” Nous 37 [2012], 342–352; Pace, “The Epistemic Value
of Moral Considerations”; Mark Schroeder, “Stakes, Withholding, and
Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge,” Philosophical Studies 160 [2012]:
265–285; and Thomas Kelly, “How to Be an Epistemic Permissivist,” in
Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, ed. John Turri and Ernest Sosa, 2nd
ed. [Wiley-Blackwell, 2014], 298–311.)
James’s discussion of the two-part truth goal suggests that it would be
a bad thing practically and epistemically if the norms we adopt are too
strict. Suppose—as some epistemologists have argued—that infallible evidential standards are built into our ordinary concept of knowledge. On
the interpretation of IER that takes “sufficient” evidence to be short for
“sufficient for knowledge,” James’s critique seems powerful. Infallibilist
standards privilege avoiding error way too much, guaranteeing that we
will fail to believe things that are important to believe if they are true. If
evidentialism demands that we have sufficient evidence for knowledge
and knowledge requires that, so much the worse for evidentialism (and,
perhaps, so much the worse for the idea that knowledge is a category of
great epistemic value). Moreover, this critique is epistemic and not merely
pragmatic, since it involves thinking about the best way to balance our
two-part cognitive goal.
In his discussion of the passage quoted above, Aikin accuses James
of relying on an uncharitable interpretation of Clifford that attributes to
Clifford a commitment to implausibly high evidential standards. That
may be right, although it is open to James’s defenders to point out, as I
did above, that not much guidance is given by Aikin or Clifford regarding
how high the standards are. Aikin also interprets James as defending the
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right to follow only the command to believe truths, giving no heed to the
risks of error. He points out that it would be abhorrent for Clifford’s shipbuilder to believe that the ship is seaworthy on the grounds that he values
taking courageous risks in believing and doesn’t care so much about being
wrong. However, I think that this is an uncharitable reading of James.
The initial conditions that James gives for engaging the will to believe
arguably already give some weight to the “avoid errors” part of the truth
goal, insofar as they require the belief to be a live hypothesis that cannot
be decided on intellectual grounds. (I have elsewhere argued that James
should have required that evidence at least make a proposition more
likely than not in order for it to be permissible to believe it [Pace, “The
Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations”].) Aikin seems in several places
to overlook this (but you can’t just ignore the talkin’ when you don’t think
the argument’s rockin’!). Further, although James does, admittedly, sometimes talk as if the best way to balance the competing truth goals is purely
a matter of personal preference, it is not too difficult to think of ways to
extend James’s view so that we can morally criticize people (such as the
shipbuilder) who fail to take into account serious moral costs involved
in avoiding errors or failing to believe truths. (See Pace, “The Epistemic
Value of Moral Considerations.”)
On an interpretation of James that puts his discussion of the truth goal
at center stage, the doxastically efficacious belief counterexamples are
supplemental points that are not central to his main argument. Such an
interpretation has the advantage of not forcing us to revise the thesis he
claims to defend or attribute to him an obvious fallacy. But what about Aikin’s claim that James betrays his dependence on the counterexamples in
choosing to defend his unorthodox proposition about the value of eternal
things? Also, is Aikin right that James commits the old switcheroo in defending that proposition? I don’t think so. James advertises from the start
that his argument is going to be highly personal, depending on which
propositions are live hypotheses given one’s evidential situation. He is
also forthright in stating that he does not find traditional Christian teachings to be live hypotheses. (Late in the book, Aikin dismisses traditional
religious claims out of hand on the grounds that the evidence weighs too
heavily against them, so he is in agreement with James on this point.) This
is enough to explain why the religious proposition James explicitly defends is unorthodox, but it also allows (as James seem to have intended)
that the argument can be adapted by someone who takes different religious claims to be live options and who can defend them as such. True
enough, if it can be shown that the evidence against traditional religious
claims is overwhelming, this will sink such a project. But that was part
of the dialectic from the start, and determining which religious hypotheses, if any, are live is beyond the scope of what James (or Aikin) sets out
to do.

